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Britain’s attempt to distance itself from Israel as London sought to conciliate the Arab 
world in the aftermath of the Six Day War has entered the historiography of Anglo-
Israeli relations. A neglected aspect of the development of British policy towards Israel 
has been the intense debates among British decision-makers regarding the supply of 
tanks to Israel following the 1967 conflict. British reluctance to export the powerful 
Chieftain tank to Israel stemmed not only from an unwillingness to fuel an arms race in 
the Middle East, but also from a determination to protect ongoing and extensive British 
economic interests in the Arab world, especially oil supplies. In keeping with efforts to 
dissociate itself from Israel, Britain also sought to downplay, and even conceal from 
the Arab world, ongoing sales of the less sophisticated Centurion tank to Israel. In 
many ways, British policy towards Israel culminated in the decision during the 1973 
Yom Kippur War to maintain an arms embargo to the region which, while not 
extending to all Arab countries, hit Israel especially hard as it desperately sought 
ammunition and spares for its Centurion tanks. 
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The historiography of Anglo-Israeli relations identifies a distinct cooling of the relationship 
between the two countries in the aftermath of the 1967 Six Day War.1 As Britain sought to 
limit the damage which could be inflicted on its fragile economy by the actions of Arab oil 
producers, a palpable effort to distance itself from Israel took place. Even before the ceasefire 
on 10 June the British Cabinet concluded: ‘Our aim must continue to be to seek to improve 
our relations with the Arab States and we must be seen publicly to be opposed to any extreme 
proposals which Israel might put forward following her victory.’2 In line with this approach, 
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Labour Foreign Secretary George Brown informed the United Nations General Assembly on 
21 June 1967 that Britain had neither taken part in, nor actively backed, Israeli military 
action, provoking Israel’s Foreign Minister Golda Meir to brand him a ‘Judas’.3 Israeli 
premier Levi Eshkol, moreover, portrayed Brown as an ‘enemy’ of Israel, adding that the 
British government ‘seemed to be taking the lead in every effort to whittle any Israeli 
position: First over Jerusalem and ... in the United Nations’.4 Not only did Britain seek to 
adopt a position sympathetic to the Arabs regarding the territories occupied by Israel during 
the 1967 conflict, but also sponsored United Nations Resolution 242 which called for Israeli 
withdrawal from these territories.5 
A neglected aspect of Britain’s attempts to distance itself from Israel and conciliate 
the Arab world in the aftermath of the Six Day War, however, relates to arms sales.6 Given 
Israeli’s dependence on foreign supplies for weapons deemed vital for its defence and 
national survival, arms sales arguably became the touchstone of British attitudes towards the 
Jewish state. Using official British sources, this article focuses on the development of British 
policy on tank sales following the 1967 conflict. This issue reached the highest levels of 
British government, Prime Minister Harold Wilson recalling that it took up a ‘great deal of 
my time and that of the Cabinet Defence [and Oversea Policy] committee’.7 The question of 
tanks sales consumed so much ministerial (and prime ministerial) time since it became 
entangled in the wider Arab-Israeli conflict and as such had the potential to inflict severe 
damage on key British interests in the Middle East. Britain’s reluctance to export the 
powerful Chieftain tank to Israel, and attempts to downplay ongoing sales of the less 
sophisticated Centurion, was symptomatic of a re-orientation of British policy towards Israel 
which stemmed from Britain’s determination to safeguard its extensive economic interests in 
the Arab world, especially oil supplies from Arab producers. It also reflected the erosion of 
the broad pro-Israeli consensus in British politics which was symbolized, for instance, 
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by the formation in 1967 of the cross-party Arab lobby group, the Council for Arab-
British Understanding.8 In the short term the damage to Anglo-Israeli relations was 
mitigated by the continuation of Centurion sales and by Israel’s acquisition of American M60 
main battlefield tanks instead of Chieftains. It would take another upsurge in Arab-Israeli 
tension, culminating in the 1973 Yom Kippur War, to expose fully the degree to which 
British policy, not least on arms sales, had shifted decisively in the direction of the Arabs to 
the detriment of Israel. 
I 
As early as 1953, Israel had requested 30 Centurion tanks.9 Although Britain eventually 
agreed to provide six, this was revoked in response to Israel’s Gaza raid in February 1955.10 
Subsequent Israeli attempts to secure Centurions over the next eighteen months were also 
rebuffed by Britain which feared the reactions of its Arab allies, not least Jordan. Zach Levey 
has noted that ‘London’s refusal to deliver the Centurion tank, the military item Israel most 
wanted to purchase from Britain, meant that in Israeli eyes, Britain had failed the litmus test 
of willingness to ensure the security of the Jewish state.’11 From the late 1950s, however, 
Britain became a major provider of tanks to Israel, supplying some 660 Centurions by 1970.12 
Indeed, the Centurion became Israel’s main battlefield tank, a significant development 
against the background of the intractable Arab-Israeli dispute and Israel’s ongoing sense of 
insecurity. 
The British decision to sell Centurions signified a palpable warming of Anglo-Israeli 
relations since the chill that had entered them at the time of the 1956 Suez crisis, triggered by 
Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s nationalization of the Suez Canal Company. 
Despite ‘colluding’ with Israel to bring about a military solution to the crisis,13 British Prime 
Minister Anthony Eden and his inner circle sought to dissociate themselves from Israel’s 
attack on Egypt which began at the end of October 1956. Indeed, operational commanders 
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were told: ‘You will not treat Israel as our Ally…. you should avoid any co-operation or co-
ordination of operations with the Israeli forces’.14 With indignation, Israeli Minister of 
Defence Moshe Dayan recalled: ‘Britain hated the very idea that her name might possibly be 
smeared as partners with Israel in military action against Arabs, but at the same time she 
would welcome the chance of exploiting Israel’s conflict with the Arabs to justify her action 
against Egypt’.15 
An improvement in Anglo-Israeli relations followed the 1958 Iraqi revolution as both 
Israel and Britain perceived advantages in co-operating, not least in stabilizing the Hashemite 
monarchy in Jordan.16 Israeli premier David Ben-Gurion, in particular, sought to use the 
improvement to acquire arms from Britain, especially tanks.17 The Foreign Office recognized 
that ‘the Centurions are really the touchstone of our relations as far as the Israelis are 
concerned’.18 For its part, Britain recognized the benefits of improved relations with Israel, 
symbolized by the invitation extended to Golda Meir to visit London in August 1958, 
followed by the decision in December to lift the former embargo and supply Israel with 
Centurion tanks.19 Although Britain agreed to provide Israel with 60 Centurions, the Foreign 
Office stressed that ‘the possession of Centurions by Israel should remain secret for as long 
as possible, and that in any case the total number to be supplied should not be known’.20 Mrs 
Meir had already issued firm instructions regarding secrecy, warning that ‘heads would fall’ 
if they were infringed.21 In April 1960, agreement was reached to increase the number of 
Centurions exported to Israel to 9022 and although a subsequent request for a further 90 was 
whittled down to 45,23 Britain found itself in the position of having supplied some 135 heavy 
tanks to Israel by 1963. In September 1964, shortly before the fall of the Conservative 
government, ministerial consent was provided for the sale of a further 250 Centurion tanks 
and related equipment over a three-year period.24 
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During talks with Levi Eshkol in March 1965, the new Labour Prime Minister, Harold 
Wilson, confirmed that, when the deliveries of Centurions were complete, his government 
would be ‘perfectly ready’ to discuss the further supply of military equipment, the only 
stipulation being that talks on arms deliveries would remain ‘confidential’.25 Subsequently, 
Foreign Office officials chided their counterparts in the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
when Eshkol let slip that British Centurions would be on display at Israel’s independence day 
celebrations.26 
At the beginning of the Six Day War, triggered by President Nasser of Egypt’s 
closure on 22 May 1967 of the Straits of Tiran to Israeli shipping, the Times estimated that 
Israel possessed some 250 British-made Centurion tanks.27 The Centurions played a major 
role in the land war, especially in the Sinai Peninsula.28 Despite imposing at the start of the 
conflict a 24-hour delay on arms supplies to the region, including 10 Centurion tanks destined 
for Israel, Britain quickly resumed shipments. As the Cabinet conceded: ‘some other 
countries, and especially the Soviet Union, were continuing to supply arms and the continued 
imposition of a delay on our part might lead to Israel suffering greater difficulties than the 
Arab states in maintaining her forces’.29 Moshe Gat points out that Britain had ‘stood by 
Israel since the Suez Campaign, supplying it with the weapons that it needed before and 
during the June 1967 War’.30 However, the widespread perception in the Arab world that 
Britain had favoured the Israelis in the 1967 conflict, and the consequent imposition of an oil 
embargo by Arab producers,31 contributed to a more circumspect approach by Her Majesty’s 
Government towards arms sales to Israel. Although it was decided at the end of July 1967 
that a further 18 Centurions could be despatched to Israel, this was balanced by a 
simultaneous determination to supply British-made Hunter aircraft to Jordan.32 Further Israeli 
requests for large consignments of tanks placed Britain in a dilemma which threatened its 
relations with both Israel and the Arab world. 
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Despite Israeli victory in the Six Day War, the Egyptian leadership, as Ahron 
Bregman points out, did not ‘lose its appetite to reorganize itself to hit back at the Israelis’, an 
aim facilitated by the Soviet Union’s decision to re-equip the Egyptian armed forces.33 It was 
against the background of ongoing Egyptian-Israeli hostilities,34 especially along the Suez 
Canal, that the Israeli government asked Britain in November 1968 to provide a further 200 
Centurions, as well as 250 Chieftain tanks, over a four-year period. Unsurprisingly, the 
request stimulated lively debate among British decision-makers.  
Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart argued in favour of supplying the Centurions, but 
against the supply of the more powerful and up-to-date Chieftains which at the time boasted 
the most powerful main gun and heaviest armour of any tank in the world. While accepting 
that a refusal would result in the loss of a valuable export order and the advantages for the 
possible sale of Chieftains elsewhere which an Israeli order might produce, Stewart argued 
that ‘it would avoid putting at risk our large military and civil export orders to the Arab 
countries and setting back the improvement in our relations with these countries which we 
had achieved since the war in 1967’.35 Bolstering his argument still further, the Foreign 
Secretary recorded that, since there was no evidence that the Soviet Union intended to furnish 
the Arab countries with T62 tanks which were comparable in performance to the Chieftain, 
‘it would be contrary to our policy to be the first to introduce weapons into the Middle East 
which had a greater offensive power than those already there’.36 Recalling that a major 
objective of British policy was a peace settlement in the Middle East, Stewart also noted that 
‘At present the attitude of Israel was the main obstacle to progress, and it would not be wise 
to encourage her to believe that we were ready to supply all the arms that she requested.’37 
 Defence Secretary Denis Healey, by contrast, favoured the sale of Chieftains to Israel. 
On the commercial side, he pointed out that were Britain to refuse to supply the Chieftains, 
the whole of the Israeli order might be lost. He also cast doubt on whether Britain would lose 
7 
 
orders in the Arab world as a result of the sale of Chieftains to Israel. As regards military 
arguments, he stressed that in the opinion of the Chiefs of Staff, the military balance in the 
region had moved to Israel’s disadvantage since the 1967 war. In consequence, Healey 
suggested that the sale of Chieftains to Israel would ‘merely restore the military balance 
between the two sides’.38 The Defence Secretary’s arguments proved influential among his 
colleagues, the Cabinet Defence and Oversea Policy Committee recommending that Britain 
should supply not only the Centurion tanks to Israel, but Chieftains too. The Foreign 
Secretary, however, was invited to investigate further the likely effects of Chieftain sales to 
Israel on civil and military exports to Arab countries. 
 In his report to the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee on 13 November 1968, 
Stewart stressed that orders from Arab countries that might be imperilled by the sale of 
Chieftains to Israel amounted to some £500 million.39 This compared with the value of the 
Israeli order of just £30 million over four years, possibly rising in the longer term to £80 
million. While Stewart accepted the unlikelihood of the whole of the £500 million being lost, 
he stressed that ‘the cancellation of only a small part of it would more than counterbalance 
any advantage to be derived from the Israeli order’.40 Stewart also disputed the claim that the 
military balance had moved against Israel since the Six Day War, pointing out that in June 
1967 Israel been at a quantitative disadvantage of one to five in tanks, whereas by the end of 
1968 the figure was one to four. The Foreign Secretary also averred that to supply Chieftains 
in the absence of any solid evidence that the Soviets were planning to provide T62s to the 
Arabs would give an ‘upward twist to the arms spiral and might even precipitate a Soviet 
decision to supply T62s’.41 Given the delicate state of Arab-Israeli relations, moreover, 
Stewart emphasized that ‘To agree to supply the Chieftains at this moment might suggest that 
we were encouraging the Israelis in their intransigence and in particular their refusal to 
withdraw from the occupied territories’.42 
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 The Defence Secretary, nonetheless, continued to argue the case for the supply of 
both Centurions and Chieftains to the Israelis. While accepting that the disparity in tank 
strength may have moved slightly in Israel’s favour, Healey underlined that it was ‘still very 
great’.43 He also questioned the damaging effects of the sale of Chieftains to Israel on the 
grounds that in the past orders had been received from Arab countries even at times when 
they knew that Britain was also supplying Israel. 
 Once again, Healey’s arguments proved persuasive, the Defence and Oversea Policy 
Committee agreeing that the balance of advantage rested with supplying both Chieftains and 
Centurions to Israel. Summing up, nevertheless, Harold Wilson stressed the merit of 
maintaining secrecy in order to minimize any ‘damaging consequences’.44 The importance of 
avoiding publicity soon became evident against the background of a French trade drive in the 
region. Referring to the putative sale of Chieftains to Israel, the British Political Resident in 
the Gulf, Sir Stewart Crawford, remarked that it would be ‘most unfortunate if French efforts 
to penetrate this market were given in the near future a considerable fillip by our taking a 
decision which outraged the Arab countries’.45 More specifically, Crawford fretted that the 
Ruler of Abu Dhabi, Sheikh Zaid, might cancel a recent order for British Hunter aircraft in 
favour of French Mirages. Anticipating Britain’s formal withdrawal from the Gulf by the end 
of 1971, moreover, he urged that ‘the longer we can keep the Gulf States following the good 
habit of buying British the better’, something that a delay in supplying the Israelis with arms 
would facilitate.46 
 The British Ambassador to Kuwait, Sam Falle, also entered the debate. Basing his 
judgements on the belief that it was the Arab states which were ‘now ready for peace if only 
somebody could show them a way to it which did not look like surrender’, the Ambassador 
asserted that it was ‘Israel upon whom such pressure is going to have to be brought if such a 
way is to be found’.47 ‘In these circumstances’, continued Falle, ‘it is surely the crassest folly 
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to increase the armed strength of Israel by the supply of further tanks – not in themselves a 
particularly defensive weapon, but one which is calculated to increase their arrogance and 
their belief that time is on their side.’48 Referring explicitly to land occupied by Israel in 
1967, the Ambassador opined: ‘I do not see how we can ever hope to get them out of that 
territory if we make them so strong that they need fear nothing’.49 
 In further discussions at the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee in May 1969, 
Foreign Secretary Stewart maintained his opposition to the sale of Chieftains, arguing that a 
decision in favour would not only increase regional tensions, but also reduce the prospects of 
a successful outcome of the four-power talks between the United States, the Soviet Union, 
France, and Britain aimed at settling the ongoing Arab-Israeli dispute.50 In response, Denis 
Healey raised the fear that if Israel did not obtain more modern tanks, it might be tempted to 
embark on a preventative war or even press ahead with nuclear arms development.51 
In spite of the improvement in Anglo-Israeli relations from the late 1950s, British 
fears about Israeli nuclear capability persisted. With French assistance, a nuclear 
facility had been built at Dimona in the Negev desert.52 When pressed on its uses by 
British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan in 1961, the Israeli premier, David Ben-
Gurion, focused on the imperative to provide cheap power.53 The British remained 
unconvinced, however, about the pacific aims of Israel’s nuclear policy and feared that 
in fact it represented a threat to Middle Eastern stability.54 British concerns had been 
heightened by reports in 1964 of co-operation between the Federal Republic of 
Germany and Israel in the nuclear field. ‘It strikes one as ethically indefensible’, 
thundered one Foreign Office mandarin, ‘for the Germans to try to expiate their crimes 
towards Jewry by helping Israel to construct weapons of mass destruction.’55 The fact 
that Argentina had confirmed the sale of uranium to Israel provided another cause for 
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concern.56 The Foreign Office concluded in 1966 that ‘the only prudent course is to 
continue to assume that the Israelis wish to maintain a nuclear option’.57 
Despite longstanding fears of Israel’s nuclear ambitions, Healey’s apocalyptic 
visions did not sway his colleagues on the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee and, 
indeed, there was a perceptible weakening of support for the sale of Chieftains. In 
discussion, members of the Committee recognized that representatives of Arab countries 
were constantly probing Britain’s intentions towards Israel.58 The signing of a formal 
memorandum of understanding with Israel would prevent Britain from deflecting such 
enquiries with the platitude that no decision had been made. Stress was also laid on the ‘very 
great economic damage’ which could result from Arab hostility. With the winding down of 
Britain’s formal military presence in the Gulf in mind, moreover, the possibility of the 
harassment of Britain’s remaining forces there was also a cause for concern. Summing up the 
discussion, Stewart recorded that although it remained Britain’s intention to supply Chieftains 
to Israel, it would be ‘unwise to enter into any further commitment with the Israelis at this 
stage’.59 
During subsequent discussions with Israeli Prime Minister Golda Meir in June 1969, 
Labour Cabinet minister Richard Crossman admitted that ‘we were enormously aware of our 
Arab interests and the pressure they were exerting on us’.60 Wilson himself explicitly 
informed Mrs Meir that ‘News of a decision to supply would affect the Four Power talks61 
and our relations with the Arabs.’62 Despite his reputation for being a strong supporter of 
Israel,63 Wilson also stressed the importance, from the point of view of these talks, of 
Her Majesty’s Government not putting themselves ‘out of court with the Arabs’.64 
During subsequent discussions with Denis Healey, Mrs. Meir characterized the British 
decision to hold up a decision on the signature of the memorandum of understanding on the 
Chieftains as a ‘form of sanctions designed to bring Israel into line’.65 She added that she felt 
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‘most deeply about the decision, not only as an Israeli, but as a Socialist who had looked to a 
British Socialist Government for help’.66 However, her suggestion that Britain and Israel in 
effect become defence production allies was rebuffed by Stewart who told the Israeli premier 
that ‘If H.M.G. were to agree to manufacture or assembly in Israel – a continuing process – 
the strain on Anglo-Arab relations would be that much greater.’67 Complicating matters still 
further, the Israeli Ambassador in London, Aharon Remez, set about lobbying back-bench 
Labour MPs on the supply of Chieftains, thus undermining the principle of secrecy which the 
Wilson government had strongly favoured.68 
Sensing that the tide was turning against the Chieftain deal, Britain’s Ambassador in 
Tel Aviv, E. J. Barnes, sent a seventeen-page letter to Michael Stewart in August 1969 in 
which he made a strong appeal for the sale to go ahead.69 If Britain capitulated over 
Chieftains, he argued, ‘we should be subjected to further Arab attempts to curb the sale of 
equipment of a military nature or possible military application’. He estimated that Britain 
stood to lose £100 million in defence contracts alone, quite apart from the likely adverse 
effects on its civilian trade with Israel. He also queried the strength of the Arab reaction in the 
longer term to a decision to supply Israel with Chieftains. ‘I know the Arabs are quite capable 
of cutting off their economic noses to spite their political face’, he observed, ‘but experience 
shows that they usually graft it on again fairly soon. They need our goods and they need to 
sell their oil.’ In addition, Barnes was sceptical about the impact of the Chieftain deal on 
Britain’s ability to influence the two sides in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict: ‘I am 
frankly doubtful whether we are in a position to persuade either Israel or the Arabs to accept 
an unwelcome settlement, or even a settlement with some unwelcome aspects. Certainly, if 
the Russians cannot persuade the Egyptians, nor the Americans the Israelis, I do not see how 
we could be in any better position to do so with either side.’ In an effort to find a compromise 
solution to the Chieftain dilemma, Barnes advocated Britain’s agreement to partial 
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manufacture and assembly in Israel itself, coupled with a verbal undertaking to the Israelis, 
rather than the signing of a full-blown memorandum of understanding. Concluding his essay 
on the Chieftain deal, Barnes warned that ‘the government and people of Israel will 
undoubtedly regard our attitude on this as a shibboleth by which they will judge the sincerity 
of our friendship for this small and embattled country … which shares so many of our own 
political and social ideals’. 
Despite the eloquence of Barnes’ appeal, FCO mandarins were not swayed by his 
arguments. A. A. Acland of the Near East Department was an especially stern critic, 
questioning whether the Israeli response to a refusal to supply Chieftains would spread as 
rapidly or as deeply as Barnes feared to other forms of cooperation.70 Acland also 
pragmatically pointed out that British interests in the Arab world far outweighed those in 
Israel. In particular, he noted that ‘British investments in the Arab world are £166 million, in 
Israel £2.5 million; average British exports to the Arab world are £211 million, to Israel £64 
million. Imports from the Arab world are £302 million, from Israel £30 million.’71 Moreover, 
Acland emphasized that the Chieftain sale had become an ‘emotional issue’ on which the 
Arab world had focused and that the supply of a new type of tank, while Israel remained in 
occupation of Arab territory, was considered by Arabs to be ‘particularly offensive’.72 He 
also dismissed the idea of a partial manufacture of Chieftains in Israel with the observation 
that it would ‘compound the offence in Arab eyes and would ensure sharper action against 
British firms involved through the Arab boycott machinery’.73 Conversely, Goronwy Roberts, 
Minister of State at the FCO, was sceptical about the dangers of an Israeli boycott of British 
goods, recalling that ‘at the height of Israeli resentment of British policy in the late ‘40s, no 
such boycott developed’.74 
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II 
By the time the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee considered the matter again in the 
autumn of 1969, the context in which ministers were making decisions had altered markedly. 
First, Britain had received a number of representations from Arab governments.75 Britain’s 
Ambassador to the United Nations, Lord Caradon, had also confirmed that ‘quite apart from 
the damage which would be done to our relations with the Arabs by the supply of tanks, the 
whole credibility of his position in the discussions of the Middle East issue in New York 
would be destroyed’.76 Reiterating in the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee his earlier 
assertion that Britain’s commercial stake in the Arab world was many times greater than that 
in Israel, Michael Stewart stressed that the Arabs would be in a position to ‘damage our 
economy through their holdings of sterling and through interference with the flow of oil’.77 
Furthermore, he raised the fear of attacks on British lives and property in Arab countries 
should the sale of Chieftains go ahead, as well as warning his colleagues of the Israelis’ 
intention of committing Britain ‘irrevocably’ to their side, one consequence of which would 
be that ‘we should be able to exercise no influence in the Four Power talks’.78  Significantly, 
Denis Healey, hitherto a strong advocate of selling Chieftains to Israel, turned decisively 
against the sale, arguing that it was ‘out of all proportion to the possible gain’.79 In particular, 
he conceded that ‘we would put in jeopardy our future arms sales to the Arab countries and 
the future of our training facilities in Libya, and we might create for ourselves a very 
unpleasant situation in the Persian Gulf at the time of our withdrawal’.80 The question of 
supplying Israel with Chieftains, however, became entangled with the situation in Libya. 
Since the revolution on 1 September 1969 Libya had been in a state of flux. Before 
the revolution, Britain had signed a contract to supply Libya with Chieftains against which 
Britain had already received £10 million. Ministers feared that a cancellation in response to 
the decision not to supply the Israelis risked jeopardizing Britain’s military training facilities 
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in Libya, as well the termination of an existing air defence contract with Libya worth some 
£155 million. ‘It would be illogical,’ agreed ministers on the Defence and Oversea Policy 
Committee, ‘having decided to deny Chieftains to Israel for reasons which were substantially 
economic, to deprive ourselves of a large part of the economic benefits of that decision by 
jeopardising both the Libyan arms contract and Libyan oil supplies’.81 In his diary, the 
Secretary of State for Social Services, Richard Crossman, confided that his colleague on the 
Defence and Oversea Policy Committee, President of the Board of Trade Roy Mason, had 
been ‘fanatically in favour of as much trade as possible and of our unloading £500 million-
worth of the most modern kind of armaments on the these poor Arabs, which is perfectly safe 
because they are not fit to use any of them’.82 There was general support in the Defence and 
Oversea Policy Committee for the view that Britain’s commercial interests in the Arab world 
were far greater than in Israel and that ‘earlier experience illustrated the speed and bitterness 
with which the Arab countries might retaliate against those interests if we supplied Chieftain 
tanks to Israel’.83 As a result of such considerations, Barnes was instructed to inform the 
Israeli government of a further delay on whether or not to supply Chieftains.84 During 
discussions with Golda Meir and her Foreign Minister, Abba Eban, British Cabinet member 
George Thomson confessed that ‘great sacrifices’ had been made to put Britain’s economic 
affairs to rights and ‘We simply could not afford to set all this at risk again.’85 He added: 
‘Our experience in 1967 when even a short-term denial of Arab oil had done us grave damage 
could not be overlooked.’86 
 By the time the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee met again at the beginning of 
November 1969,87 events had moved on with dizzying speed, the new revolutionary 
government in Tripoli requesting negotiations for the early withdrawal of British forces 
stationed in Libya which in turn lessened the chances of the retention of Britain’s training 
facilities there. The prospects for establishing co-operative relations with the new regime 
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were also vitiated by the anti-British demonstrations in the capital which had resulted in 
damage to British property, including the embassy itself.88 Summing up the mood of the 
meeting, Harold Wilson remarked: ‘If the Libyans insisted on unconditional evacuation by 
British forces of their territories and also sought to confine the arms supply contract to the 
controversial Chieftains, the Committee might well consider that the political disadvantages 
of agreeing to supply outweighed the benefits.’89 
With respect to the contemporaneous Israeli request for Chieftains, the Defence and 
Oversea Policy Committee comforted itself with the thought that the Israelis were 
‘sufficiently sophisticated to understand that, just as they were preoccupied with their 
physical survival, the requirement for which dominated all aspects of their policy, so we, for 
our part, had to concentrate on economic survival. They would recognise the very great 
economic damage which the Arab countries could inflict in reprisal for a firm commitment to 
supply Chieftains to Israel.’90 Roy Mason had gone so far as to declare: ‘The effect on the 
Arab world of the sale of Chieftains to Israel would be so great on our economy that it would 
knock us back for two years.’91 As a result of such considerations, it was decided to inform 
the Israelis that in existing circumstances a memorandum of understanding on the supply of 
Chieftains could not be signed and that, in consequence, HMG would understand if they 
sought to meet their tank requirements from other sources.92 In response, Eban criticized 
what he considered to be a ‘growing tendency of the British government to yield to Arab 
obduracy in matters affecting Israel’s security and her central political interests’.93 The Israeli 
Ambassador in London, Aharon Remez, had earlier informed Michael Stewart that his 
government was ‘very uneasy at the turn of events were now taking. The present decision 
showed how economic pressures could be used on future occasions. Arab threats could lead 
to Israel’s interests being overruled’.94 
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As regards Libya, Foreign Secretary Stewart made a powerful case against the supply 
of Chieftains on the grounds that ‘In present circumstances it would be wrong to introduce 
into the Middle East a powerful new weapon held by no other Middle Eastern country, and 
which was not being supplied to Israel.’95 His arguments proved persuasive. In March 1970, 
the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee came out strongly against the idea of supplying 
Chieftains to Libya.96 Summarising towards the end of 1970 the dilemma which had faced 
British decision-makers, the principal private secretary to the Foreign Secretary, J. A. N. 
Graham, recalled that 
In theory, it might have been possible to supply Chieftains to both sides 
simultaneously, but in practice such a transition would have been difficult, if not 
impossible, to arrange and might well have left us, while enjoying the commercial 
fruits, suffering many of the political and physical disadvantages and dangers of 
supplying one side or the other.97 
As regards Anglo-Israeli relations, the damage inflicted was mitigated by American 
willingness to sell M60 tanks to Israel which prompted the Israeli Deputy Minister of 
Defence, General Tsur, to declare that the Chieftain problem had been ‘solved’.98 
The British decision to withhold Chieftains from Israel left unresolved the question of 
the supply of further Centurions. When the Israeli Ambassador was informed at the end of 
1969 that the sale of Chieftains could not proceed, Foreign Secretary Stewart had pledged to 
continue supplying Centurions.99 A subsequent approach by the Israeli defence attaché for the 
purchase of an additional 200 Centurions presented Britain with the problem of honouring 
this commitment. As one Foreign Office mandarin observed with respect to the Arabs: ‘any 
sign that the supply is continuing while Israel shows no sign of withdrawing from the 
occupied territories will be pounced on by them, or brought to their notice by the 
Russians’.100 In an effort to mitigate the presentational problems of continuing to supply 
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Centurions under existing arrangements – 10 used tanks a month surplus to the needs of the 
British army – ministers refused to be drawn regarding an overall figure.101 Even with this 
limited commitment, the Foreign Office was eager to maintain as much secrecy as possible, 
underscoring the ‘grave damage which any leak might do to our relations with the Arab 
world’.102 
III 
On 19 June 1970 the Conservative Government of Edward Heath came to office. Assailed by 
economic problems, the new administration was equally, if not more, determined to avoid 
alienating the Arab world than its Labour predecessor had been. In a speech in Harrogate at 
the end of October 1970, Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home called for the 
implementation of Resolution 242 and Israeli withdrawal from the territories seized in 
1967,103 sentiments which Geraint Hughes has depicted as ‘closer to those of “moderate” 
states such as Egypt than those of Israel and the United States’.104 Certainly, the Harrogate 
speech was well received in Cairo,105 but poorly so in Israel.106 In the event of President 
Nixon referring to Douglas-Home’s statement during Edward Heath’s forthcoming visit to 
Washington, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office advised the Prime Minister to explain 
that 
our interests in the Middle East are different both in nature and in proportion from 
those of the Americans. We do not have the same responsibility for Israel and for 
persuading it to move towards a settlement as the Americans: and our material stake 
in the region is more important than is that of the Americans to them.107 
Despite Douglas-Home’s Harrogate speech, he did recommend a positive response to 
the Israeli defence attaché in London’s request for further deliveries of second-hand 
Centurion tanks after January 1971 when deliveries under the existing arrangements were due 
to cease.108 In justifying this position, Douglas-Home pointed out that Britain had supplied 
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Jordan with 100 Centurions in the previous eighteen months and was in the process of 
concluding an agreement to provide a further sixteen. He also pragmatically noted that ‘The 
Arabs know that we have been supplying Israel with Centurions since the June War and must 
suspect that supply is continuing.’109 Secretary of State for Defence Lord Carrington, who 
later was to acquire the reputation of being sympathetic towards the Arabs during his 
tenure as Foreign Secretary in the first Thatcher government,110 concurred with 
Douglas-Home’s analysis. He added that, while the Israelis had come to accept that 
Britain would not supply Chieftains to countries involved in the Middle Eastern 
conflict, ‘they would certainly not understand a refusal (or an undue delay in giving 
them an answer) by us to continue to supply them with 10 second-hand Centurions per 
month.’111 Carrington also commented that the Centurions which Britain had been supplying 
to Jordan were in fact later marks with lower mileage. While supporting the continued supply 
of second-hand Centurions to Israel, Secretary of State for Trade and Industry John Davies 
cautioned that ‘It should go without saying that publicity in any form, whether by us or the 
Israelis or anyone, should as far as possible be avoided, but perhaps the point is worth 
making.’112 Having satisfied himself that there was ‘not likely to be a really dangerous 
reaction by the Arabs if news of the decision should get out’, Chancellor of the Exchequer, 
Anthony Barbour, backed the supply of Centurions to Israel.113 A broad consensus among 
ministers having been reached, Heath approved Douglas-Home’s original proposal.114 Shortly 
after this, the Prime Minister revived the debate about the supply of Chieftain tanks to the 
region, observing with respect to the Arab-Israeli conflict that ‘both sides will end up getting 
tanks equivalent to the Chieftain from other sources and that we shall lose out to no good 
purpose’.115 
 In a full-scale review of British policy on arms sales to the Middle East produced for 
the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee in February 1971, Foreign Office officials set out 
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a number of options from one extreme – removing all restrictions on all categories of military 
equipment to Israel and Arab states – to the other – unilaterally placing a total embargo on 
the supply of military equipment to these states.116 Douglas-Home favoured a pragmatic 
policy, akin to the government’s Labour predecessor, but applying clearer and more 
consistent principles.117 Elaborating on this point, Douglas-Home suggested that in 
considering each request for the supply of military equipment, the British government should 
take account of the effect of any decision on the prospects for achieving a peaceful settlement 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and, conversely, the likelihood of a resumption of large-scale 
hostilities; the relative military capabilities of the countries of the region; and Britain’s 
political and commercial interests in all the countries of the region.118 The Defence and 
Oversea Policy Committee endorsed the Foreign Secretary’s recommendations, Prime 
Minister Heath introducing the caveat that ‘in applying these principles we should maintain a 
clear view of our own commercial interests and seek to serve these as far as possible’.119 
With conflict once more looming in the Middle East, these principles were soon to be tested. 
At the time of the Six Day War, the Cabinet agreed not to hold up arms to the Israelis 
so long as the Soviet Union was continuing to supply the Arab states.120 The Cabinet  
subsequently pointed out that ‘if we were to default, both to Israel and to the Arab States, on 
orders which had been placed with us, we should cease to be regarded as a reliable source of 
supply and might put at risk large long-term orders already placed with us’.121 During the 
1973 Yom Kippur conflict, by contrast, Britain maintained a strict arms embargo on Israel, 
Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Iraq, and Libya, Douglas-Home informing the Cabinet that ‘We would 
sacrifice our ability to influence the peace moves and Arab policy on oil if we were to reverse 
our policy on the embargo.’122 Nevertheless, the embargo did not extend to all Arab 
countries. Explaining this apparently anomalous position, the Minister of State at the Foreign 
and Commonwealth Office, Lord Balniel, stressed that it was done ‘for reasons of Gulf 
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security, to protect our major arms sales interests in Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the Gulf, and 
above all to protect our oil interests’.123 The Israeli Ambassador to the UK pointed out that 
since the Russians were supplying the Arabs, the European arms embargo was in fact ‘one-
sided’.124 Israeli Foreign Minister Eban subsequently declared that Britain’s policy of selling 
Centurion tanks but then refusing to provide spares parts ‘was not Israel’s idea of either 
political or commercial morality’.125 
Despite Israeli (and American) pressure, the British refused to yield. When US 
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger asserted that disaster for Israel had to be avoided, the 
British Ambassador in Washington, Lord Cromer, responded: ‘U.S. re-supply of Israel could 
lead to much greater disaster. Europe would not be content to go without Middle East oil 
because of American actions.’126 While the Nixon administration undertook a massive airlift 
to re-supply the beleaguered Israelis,127 the US Ambassador to London, Walter H. 
Annenberg, accurately warned Washington that in the light of British determination that the 
UK ‘should not be involved or appear to be involved in any way with Israel nor with any 
actions in support of Israel’, the British government’s response to a request for the use of 
British bases for logistical support or transit point to the Middle East would be ‘negative’.128 
Assistant Under-Secretary at the FCO, J. A. Thomson, had in fact already requested US 
assurances that the UK would ‘in no way’ be involved in the US effort to re-supply Israel.129 
In discussions over the lifting of the British arms embargo towards the end of 1973, 
policy-makers were chary about doing anything which would enflame Arab opinion. 
Douglas-Home pointed out that criticism by Israel and its friends of the British embargo had 
contributed to Arab perceptions that it amounted to an anti-Israeli step by Britain; the 
corresponding concern was that the Arab world would regard the lifting of the embargo as a 
pro-Israeli one. He warned that resuming the supply to Israel of Centurion ammunition and 
spares ‘would lead to Arab action against our oil supplies’.130 Reviewing the arguments 
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against lifting the embargo, the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary subsequently focussed 
on ‘Criticism from Arabs when it comes out that supplies for Israel are involved.’131 
Although King Faisal of Saudi Arabia and Egyptian President Anwar Sadat had pledged to 
try and protect Britain from measures being taken by Arabs against British interests, Douglas-
Home emphasized that neither had been able to offer a guarantee. In these circumstances, he 
cautioned, ‘we risk losing our “friendly” status and with it the special arrangements we hope 
to make bilaterally for oil supplies’.132 Conversely, Douglas-Home dismissed as ‘not 
powerful’ the argument against lifting the embargo on the grounds that it would provoke 
criticism from Israel and its supporters when they realized that arms supplies were going to 
the Arabs.133 
In discussion at the Defence and Oversea Policy Committee at the end of 1973, the 
Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary noted that if Britain lifted the ban on Arab countries it 
would have to do the same for Israel. Reiterating previous arguments, he counselled that ‘The 
sale of arms to Israel at this stage ... would most likely cause an adverse reaction in certain 
Arab states with possible consequences for our oil supplies’.134 Impressed by the strength of 
Douglas-Home’s presentation, his colleagues on the Committee supported the maintenance of 
the arms embargo until there was an agreement on the disengagement of forces.135 Adding his 
voice to the debate, FCO Under-Secretary of State, Anthony Parsons, advised against an early 
lifting of the embargo since oil supplies would be put at ‘severe risk’ if Britain resumed 
sending Centurion ammunition and spare parts to Israel.136 
 
IV 
In some senses, the British approach to the Yom Kippur War represented the culmination of 
its approach to the region since the Six Day War, namely a growing dissociation from Israel 
and a corresponding effort to conciliate the Arab world. Although ethical issues, not least 
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British policy-makers’ reluctance to give the regional arms race an ‘upward twist’, played a 
part, the principal reason for the British approach stemmed from growing dependence on oil 
supplies from Arab states, something which the 1967 conflict had served to underline. The 
British refusal to supply Israel with advanced Chieftain tanks should be seen in this context. 
Although the disruption to Anglo-Israeli relations should not be exaggerated, and indeed was 
softened by Britain’s willingness to continue supplying Centurions and by Israel’s acquisition 
of alternatives for Chieftains in the form of the American M60 tank, the 1973 Yom Kippur 
War underlined Britain’s palpable tilt towards the Arab world. In many ways this approach 
was vindicated, Britain avoiding the indignity of the Arab oil embargo applied to the United 
States at the time of the 1973 conflict and the more extreme aspects of the Arab producers’ 
restrictions on oil production.137 ‘Who would have thought’, marvelled the British 
Ambassador to Lebanon, P. H. G. Wright, ‘that from another round of hostilities Britain 
would emerge – thus far at any rate – with her reputation in the Arab world (not to speak of 
her assets) not only intact, but enhanced.’138 Britain’s distancing itself from Israel, and indeed 
disengaging itself as far as possible from the Arab-Israeli dispute, was assisted by the proven 
ability of the Israelis to defend themselves and also by the knowledge that, in extremis, the 
United States would come to Israel’s rescue.139 ‘This may not sound an heroic stance’, 
George Brown had admitted in the immediate aftermath of the Six Day War, ‘but it 
corresponds to the realities governing our economic interests in the area.’140 
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